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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF LAYTON, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
SCOTT L. EGBERT, MACK G. EGBERT 
and CORA EGBERT, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
• 
• 
• 
. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 18324 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellants, Mack and Cora Egbert, appeal from a decision 
granting respondent's motion for summary judgment in the Second 
Judicial District Court, County of Davis, State of Utah, the 
Honorable J. Duffy Palmer presiding. The court ruled that a 
proposed fourth promissory note between the respondent and Scott 
and Pamela Egbert failed for lack of completion sufficient to be 
a legal contract binding the parties and as a matter of law, the 
respondent was entitled to a summary judgment. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Respondent's motion for summary judgment was granted 
after oral argument before the Honorable J. Duffy Palmer, on 
December 24, 1981. The final amended judgment was entered 
against Mack and Cora Egbert on February 25, 1982. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
This case involved a series of three notes representing 
loans taken out by Scott Egbert from the First National Bank of 
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Layton and a proposed fourth note between Scott Egbert and the 
bank intended to be a consolidation of the unpaid amounts of the 
first three notes. The appellants, Mack and Cora Egbert, are 
the parents of Scott Egbert and were co-signers on two of the 
first three loans. 
The first of these notes was signed by Scott Egbert and 
Mack Egbert on September 30, 1975 in the amount of $9,171.60. 
The loan included interest at the rate of 12.5% and carried as 
security the pledge of a 1976 Ford pickup truck belonging to 
Scott Egbert. Sixty payments of $152.86 each were to be made by 
Scott Egbert. Only twenty payments were made and of those 
twenty payments, fourteen payments were made late. The last 
payment on the first note was made July 18, 1977. 
The second note was signed by Scott Egbert and Cora 
Egbert on September 17, 1976 in the amount of $1,167.36. This 
note included interest at the rate of 13.8%. Scott Egbert's 
1976 Ford pickup truck was also assigned as collateral on this 
loan. Twenty-four payments of $48.64 ea~h were to be made by 
Scott Egbert. Only eight payments were made and of those eight, 
five were made late. The last payment on the second note was 
made June 9, 1977. 
A third note was signed by Scott Egbert on June 16, 1977 
in the amount of $350.00. This note carried an interest rate of 
12%. One payment of $360.50 (including $10.50 interest) was to 
be paid by Scott Egbert at the note's maturity, but that payment 
was never made by Scott Egbert. 
On August 24, 1978, over a year after the last payment 
had been received on any of the three notes, a proposed fourth 
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promissory note was set up in both the names of Scott Egbert and 
his wife, Pamela Egbert. Scott Egbert alone signed the note in 
the amount of $13,957.92. Pamela Egbert was not present and 
never signed the note. The proposed note was intended to be a 
consolidation and renewal of the amounts outstanding on the 
prior three notes. It did include other items of unpaid charges 
for insurance incurred on the truck posted as collateral on the 
prior notes, a charge for credit life insurance, late charges, 
and principal and interest accrued on the previous notes. The 
note provided for equal monthly installment payments of $193.86, 
which would have paid off the loan in a period of six years. 
This proposed note stated an interest rate of 13.12%. 
The loan disclosure statement attached to loan number 
four was also prepared in the names of Scott Egbert and Pamela 
Egbert. It was only signed by Scott Egbert and never signed by 
Pamela Egbert. It stated the 1976 Ford pickup truck would be 
posted as collateral, and that the borrower(s) would assign a 
certain real estate contract on property they said they owned in 
Ogden as security for the loan. In addition, the loan disclo-
sure statement indicated the proceeds of the loan would be uti-
lized to pay off the principal and interest of the three prior 
loans, pay the automobile insurance, provide credit life for the 
borrower and pay the abstract and recording fees and charges on 
the deed and assignment of escrow. 
The quit-claim deed and an assignment of escrow asso-
ciated with the proposed fourth note were prepared in both Scott 
Egbert and Pamela Egbert's names to cover the pledged real 
estate. They were signed by Scott Egbert, but were never signed 
-3-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
by Pamela Egbert, who was listed as the joint owner of the Ogden 
property. Scott Egbert's signature was never notarized. The 
assignment of escrow was never signed by the bank as vendee. No 
notarization of Scott Egbert's signature was made although in-
formation was put on the assignment for it. No notarization of 
the bank president's signature was ever made either, although 
information was typed on the assignment for the notarization. 
The respondent did not record the quit-claim deed, nor did it 
file the assignment of escrow with the escrow holder because the 
bank learned in checking the title of the property which the 
Egberts were going to assign the bank as security for the pro-
posed fourth promissory note that on July 3, 1978 the Egberts 
had transferred their interest in that property to a third 
party. Without the agreed upon security and the signature of 
Pamela Egbert the bank did not complete the paperwork and steps 
necessary to finalize the proposed fourth promissory note and 
loan. 
The appellants allege they were informed by Scott Egbert 
that their obligation on the first two notes was taken care of 
with his signing the proposed fourth promissory note, and there-
fore, the appellants took no further action to insure payments 
on any of the loans. However, the bank alleges in its affida-
vits it contacted the Egberts and informed them of their obliga-
tion on the three previous notes if the proposed fourth promis-
sory note was not consummated and paid in full by Scott and 
Pamela Egbert. 
Contrary to the facts stated by appellants, the bank did 
not stamp the words "cancelled by renewal" on the first three 
-4-
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notes at the time of the signing of the proposed fourth note. 
That action was done approximately September 15, 1978, about 
three weeks after Scott Egbert signed the proposed note and was 
done pursuant to internal procedures in the bank which they used 
in processing a loan. Different individuals in the bank were 
responsible for different functions in processing a loan appli-
cation. The procedure of stamping "cancelled by renewal" was a 
standard procedure to be done prior to the loan information 
being put on the computer. Many times this was done prior to a 
loan being finalized in order to speed up the procedure of 
having the information from the handwritten paperwork entered on 
the computer so that when the loan was finalized and completed, 
all other procedures would have been implemented so the computer 
would reflect up-to-date information and status on the account. 
The bank still has in its possession the original three notes 
and never surrendered them to the appellants or Scott Egbert. 
Computer billings were inadvertently sent out to Scott Egbert 
but this was because of the delay in finalizing the loan appli-
cation due to the title check and the status of the Egberts' 
property in Ogden. The loan application had started its normal 
process of being computerized and indeed, was put on the compu-
ter September 11, 1978 as stamped on the loan disclosure state-
ment. 
Contact was made with the appellants by the bank con-
cerning their obligation on the first two notes prior to suit 
being initiated against them. On February 22, 1980 the respon-
dent instigated legal action against the appellants and Scott 
Egbert to obtain possession of the truck which had been used as 
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collateral on the first three loans. A Writ of Replevin issued 
on February 26, 1980. The truck was not voluntarily surrendered 
but was obtained and seized by the Weber County Sheriff's office 
pursuant to the Writ of Replevin. 
The respondent amended its complaint in September 1981 
after discovery to conform the amended complaint with the new 
facts and evidence obtained through discovery and to correct 
misstatements in the original complaint. 
After a denial of appellants' motion for summary judg-
ment, on October 22, 1981, the responent filed a motion for sum-
mary judgment alleging, among other things, that the proposed 
fourth promissory note was invalid because the loan process was 
never completed and lacked sufficient consideration to bind the 
parties. Respondent further requested that judgment be granted 
against the appellants on the previous promissory notes if the 
court ruled the proposed fourth note was invalid. 
On December 24, 1981, after hearing arguments, the 
Honorable J. Duffy Palmer granted respondent's motion for sum-
mary judgment. A motion was made by the appellants challenging 
the costs assessed in said judgment and after arguing said 
motion on January 28, 1982, both appellants' and respondent's 
counsel agreed to an amended judgment amount to reflect the fact 
that Scott Egbert had filed a petition in bankruptcy and to com-
promise the contested amount of the judgment. Pursuant to said 
agreement, the final amended judgment was signed by the court on 
February 25, 1982 and from which appellants now appeal said 
judgment. 
-6-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PROPOSED FOURTH RENEWAL PROMISSORY NOTE WAS 
NEVER CONSUMMATED BETWEEN THE PARTIES AND WAS 
' THEREFORE, NOT A LEGALLY ENFORCEABLE CONTRACT.
In order for the proposed fourth promissory note with 
the given date of August 24, 1978, intended to be a renewal 
note, to have been a valid and binding legal instrument, the 
same legal principles apply as if the proposed renewal note had 
been an original first note. 
In 11 Am Jur 2d, Bills and Notes, Section 302, page 328, 
it states: 
"There must be a good and sufficient consideration 
for an extension agreement, in order to render it 
legally binding. The underlying principles of 
consideration are the same in this class of cases 
as in the case of contracts generally." 
There was an attempt between the bank and Scott and 
Pamela Egbert to make a consolidation of the three previous 
loans. The consolidation of those loans was to be the proposed 
fourth promissory note dated August 24, 1978. The Egberts' 
equity in the Ogden property they had acquired October 1, 1977 
would be given as security for the consolidated loan and the 
loan was to be in the names of Scott and Pamela Egbert. But, 
the proposed fourth promissory note never came to fruition 
because of a lack of consideration and the lack of having both 
Scott Egbert and Pamela Egbert's signatures on the appropriate 
paperwork. 
The exhibits of the respondent, (Appendix A includes the 
promissory note, the loan disclosure statement, the Uniform Real 
-7-
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Estate Contract, the quit-claim deed and the assignment of 
escrow, all of which are associated with the August 24, 1978 
proposed consolidation), clearly showed both Scott Egbert and 
Pamela Egbert were to be included on the fourth note and all the 
associated documents, but Pamela Egbert never signed any of the 
instruments. The exhibits also show the fourth note was to be 
supported by additional consideration in the form of additional 
security from an assignment of the Egbert's contract and escrow 
on their Ogden property. The documents were prepared, but that 
additional security was never received because the bank learned 
in a title check on the property that the Egberts had previously 
transferred their equity. Therefore, there was no additional 
consideration given for the proposed fourth promissory note. 
Without that consideration, there cannot be a legally binding 
enforceable renewal promissory note, i.e., no contract. 
Peterson v. Intermountain, 508 P.2d 536, 29 U.2d 271; 
Williston on Contracts, Revised Edition, Section 814. 
It is critical to note all the instruments associated 
with the proposed fourth promissory note made specific reference 
to the additional consideration of the assignment of escrow and 
deed and the necessity of the signatures of both Scott and 
Pamela Egbert. This is important in view of the general prin-
ciple of law that the consideration necessary to support a con-
tract is the consideration intended by the parties. 139 ALR 
1036. This is stated in 17 Arn Jur 2d, Contracts, Section 92, 
page 434 as follows: 
" ..• Nothing is consideration for a contract that 
is not acce ted or re arded as such b both 
part 1 es. presence o to a 
- R-
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contract which might under certain circumstances be 
upheld as a consideration for a promise does not 
necessaril make it the consideration for the 
promise in t at contract; to give it t at a ect 
it must have been offered by one party and accepted 
by the other as an element of the contract. 
Accordingly, the fortuitous presence in a 
transaction of some possibility of detriment, 
latent but unthought of, is not enough to furnish a 
consideration for a contract. The promissor and 
promissee must have dealt with it as the inducement 
to the promise." (Emphasis Added) 
The only consideration anticipated and intended by the 
parties to be the security for this proposed fourth promissory 
note was the truck and the assignment of escrow and deed on the 
Ogden property. No facts were alleged by appellants in lower 
court to show otherwise. In fact, no argument was even made 
alleging otherwise. 
The items appellants raise in their Point I to justify a 
reversal of the lower court's decision are clearly incidental 
and not agreed upon by the parties to be the consideration for 
the proposed fourth note. 
Appellants' argument that the note itself is considera-
tion has no weight when the parties agreement was to have the 
consideration the transfer of the Ogden property as shown on the 
loan disclosure statement. The intent of the parties cannot be 
replaced by an incidental item. 139 ALR 1036. The same is true 
of the additional charges for automobile insurance and credit 
life insurance. The auto insurance is a mandatory right of the 
bank to secure its collateral and if buyer doesn't maintain in-
surance, the bank has the right to obtain insurance. This is 
shown on the loan disclosure statement as number 11. 
-9-
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The different interest rate is an incidental item and 
not the consideration intended by the parties. Further, it is 
shown that the interest rate on the first note was 12.50 per-
cent, the second note 13.80 percent, the third note 12.00 per-
cent, and the proposed fourth note 13.12 percent. Thus, the 
interest rate of the proposed fourth note was both above and 
below the interest rate of some of the previous notes. The 
weighted average of the first three loans' interest was 12.73%, 
making the interest on the intended fourth note only .39 of 1% 
greater. The State Bank of Lehi and Hackin cases which Appel-
lants cite are not relevant to this case because the interest 
ref erred to as consideration in those cases was not the agreed 
upon consideration in this case. The loan disclosure statement 
specifically mentions the truck and the Ogden property as the 
stated consideration. George Wilcox affirms this in his October 
21, 1981 affidavit and further states that the renewal and ex-
tension of time of the previous notes proposed by the fourth 
note was conditioned on the additional security. Appellants 
have never shown any facts to indicate any other agreed upon 
consideration. 
The fact the 1976 Ford truck was also listed as security 
can be shown as a routine matter because the second note also 
listed the truck as security, even though the truck was already 
given as security on the first note. The important fact which 
exists with the second note which does not exist with the pro-
posed fourth note is that Scott Egbert received money from the 
bank as a result of the second note but not as a result of the 
fourth note. The lending of the money was the consideration and 
-10-
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the benefit and detriment accordingly to each of the parties 1n 
the second note. The fact that Scott Egbert never performed on 
the proposed fourth note shows that no detriment came to him as 
a result of said note and he did not rely on said note to his 
detriment. The truck clearly amounted to past consideration and 
is insufficient to support the proposed fourth note. 17 Arn Jur 
2d, Contracts, Section 125, page 471. The value of the truck 
was so much less than the amount of the proposed fourth note the 
bank needed the Ogden property to secure the note. 
It is also significant in viewing the point of consider-
ation to take into account the fact both Scott and Pamela 
Egbert's names were listed throughout the instruments that were 
intended to support the proposed fourth promissory note but that 
Scott Egbert alone signed the applicable instruments and Pamela 
Egbert never signed any of them. In addition, Scott Egbert's 
signature was never notarized. Obviously, it was the intention 
of the parties to have both Scott and Pamela Egbert sign the 
applicable instruments and the proposed fourth promissory note. 
If it was the intention of the parties to delete the requirement 
of Pamela Egbert's signature, then Pamela Egbert's name should 
have been crossed out or new forms typed, which wasn't done. It 
is clear Pamela Egbert's name was not intended to be deleted 
because: 
1. Her name was necessary in order to have a valid 
assignment of escrow and deed, on the Ogden property because 
Scott and Pamela were both listed as jointly receiving that 
property, and 
-11-
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2. Scott Egbert had defaulted on his payments on the 
three previous loans. It made no sense to consolidate his loans 
into the proposed fourth promissory note without requiring addi-
tional security or additional co-signatures. 
On pages 9 and 10 of Appellants brief, they state the 
bank was wrong for not recording the documents after Scott 
Egbert signed them. They go on to say in effect one signature 
is better than none. But they fail to realize the bank was 
under no obligation to take any action until the agreed upon 
conditions had been met by the Egberts. One of those conditions 
was the signing of the documents by both Scott and Pamela 
Egbert. The fact Scott's signature was never notarized on any 
of the documents is a good indication both signatures were 
required. It is a common practice to wait to notarize a docu-
ment which two people are to sign until the second person has 
signed. If only Scott's signature was required or agreed upon, 
then the notarization would have taken place and the loan 
process would move on to the next step. But, in this case both 
signatures were required because the property to be used as 
security was in both names and all related documents were in 
both names. 
It makes more sense and is consistent with the written 
instruments to believe the bank was willing to consolidate the 
unpaid amounts of the three prior loans into one loan if addi-
tional security was given to cover that loan. It makes little 
sense and is not consistent with the written instruments to 
believe that the bank would give up its recourse against the 
Appellants on the two prior loans to just have Scott Egbert's 
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signature and the 'incidentals' of consideration which Appel-
lants have referred to. Especially is this not realistic when 
the facts show that no payments had been made by Scott Egbert 
for over 12 months prior to August 24, 1978. Obviously, and the 
documents verify it, the bank was only willing to enter into a 
renewal and extension if additional substantial security was 
obtained. And that did not occur. 
Thus, the intention of the parties in preparing the pro-
posed fourth promissory note never was completely realized and 
therefore, the proposed fourth promissory note was not a valid 
contract and obviously, then, not binding upon the parties. 
POINT II 
THE APPELLANTS' FACTS DO NOT SUPPORT THEIR 
CLAIM OF CONSIDERATION AND ARE NOT RELEVANT TO 
THE ISSUE ON APPEAL 
In appellants' Point II they state the items asserted in 
their Point I as consideration were agreed upon by the parties 
and further state four facts which they claim support that con-
clusion. 
As to the "cancelled by renewal" stamped on the first 
three notes, the president of the bank, George Wilcox, states in 
his affidavits of September 4, 1981 and October 21, 1981 that 
this was an "internal procedure" normally done in a loan pro-
cess. This issue is not relevant unless there is a valid fourth 
note. This argument doesn't go to the validity of the proposed 
fourth note, but rather to the question that is raised if the 
fourth note were valid, i.e. what effect would the fourth note 
have on the previous three notes? 
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The case law in Utah is clear that a subsequent note may 
not relieve the parties to be charged of their obligations under 
previous notes. Marking Systems, Inc. v. Interwest Film Cor- . 
poration, 567 P.2d 176; Deseret National Bank v. Dinwoody, 17 U. 
43, 53 P. 215 (1989); First Security Bank of Utah v. Proudfit 
Sporting Goods Company, 552 P.2d 123 (Utah 1976); and Gray v. 
Kappas, 90 U. 300, 61 P.2d 613 (1936). The distinguishing 
feature in these Utah cases which hold that the subsequent note 
did not discharge the parties of the previous obligations is 
that in all of those cases there was a valid subsequent note and 
the Court was limited to the specific question of the meaning, 
intent and effect of that last note on the previous notes. 
(underlining added) Without a valid subsequent note, you don't 
need to answer the question of its effect or prior notes - the 
prior notes are still enforceable. 
The fact the bank still has the notes and never surren-
dered them shows the bank did not intend to relieve the appel-
lants of their financial obligation. 
The reason computer billings were sent to Scott Egbert 
is explained by the fact the bank computerized the account on 
September 11, 1978 as shown on the loan disclosure statement. 
This was a normal procedure in the bank's loan process so that 
when the loan was finalized it would already be on the computer. 
The computer doesn't know if a loan is legal or not, so it con-
tinued to assess late charges which later had to be manually 
corrected. Again, however, this argument doesn't go to the 
validity of the proposed fourth note, but its effect on the 
three previous notes if the fourth note were valid. 
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The respondent's and appellants' facts differ as to what 
contacts were made between the two parties and what was said. 
Legal procedures were taken by respondent to collect on all the 
notes with the filing of the complaint in this action. 
In appellants statement number 4 on page 12 of their 
brief they make reference along with Point 5 on page 14 to the 
fact respondents changed their position with their amended com-
plaint. This issue was never raised in the lower court and 
should not be considered on appeal. 
"The invariably accepted rule of appellate review 
is that no issue will be considered by the 
appellate court unless it was properly raised in 
the lower court in order to give the parties and 
the court notice and fair opportunity to meet, 
consider and pass upon that issue.'' State v. 
Gandee, 587 P.2d at 1067. 
Since it was raised, respondent will address it by 
saying the purpose of Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure is to liberally allow amendments to conform to evidence 
and succinctly address the relevant issues. Blyth & Fargo Co. 
v. Swenson, 15 U. 345, 49 P. 1027. Many complaints are amended 
for various reasons and the URCP provide that the amended 
pleadings relate back to the original filing time. To use the 
filing of an amended pleading against the party who filed it 
would thwart the use of amended pleadings and their intended 
purpose. 
The history of this case shows the complaint was filed 
for the purpose of proceeding on a Writ of Replevin. It, there-
fore, was used to support the issuance of a Writ to allow the 
Sheriff to attach the truck. The original complaint contained 
several misstatements but the only one appellants chose to men-
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tion concerned the fourth note. It should be noted, however, 
the complaint did pray for the alternative relief of either 
judgment on the entire consolidated amount of the fourth note or 
judgment on each of the notes separately, with the last alter-
native being the one used in the amended complaint. 
Other mistakes were made in the original complaint and 
corrected in the amended complaint, such as the interest on each 
note, etc. If this had been raised in the lower court and the 
court considered it relevant, respondent could have shown why 
the complaint was written the way it was and what facts respon-
dent's attorney had before filing the complaint. 
Therefore, of the four "facts" which appellants state in 
their Point II as grounds for reversal, the first three primar-
ily relate to the question of the effect of a valid fourth note 
on the three previous notes and not to the validity of the pro-
posed fourth note. The fourth "fact" is raised for the first 
time on appeal and should not be considered and is inappropriate 
anyway. 
In appellants' Point III they raise five facts which 
they state would justify sending this case to trial. 
The first, why Pamela Egbert did not sign any of the 
documents, was not raised in the lower court by appellants as an 
issue. In Scott Egbert's Answers to Interrogatories he denies 
that it was anticipated that Pamela Egbert would sign. No other 
averments are made concerning this issue even though respondent 
made it a definite point in its memorandums that she was to sign 
and the exhibits clearly showed Pamela Egbert's name typed and 
ready to be signed. To rest on that general denial and just say 
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it wasn't intended for her to sign without further factual 
representations is not enough. Rainford v. Rytting, 22 U.2d 
252, 451 P.2d 769 (1969); Summerhays v. Holm, 24 U.2d 190, 468 
P.2d 366 (1970). 
Point 2 on page 14 of appellants' brief concerning the 
impairment of security by Pamela not signing is again a new 
issue on appeal. Appellants knew what respondent's position was 
in relation to this because it was mentioned in the October 21, 
1981 affidavit of George Wilcox and referred to by respondent in 
its memorandum. Therefore, appellants had notice and should 
have raised the issue earlier. Burningham v. OTT, 525 P.2d 
620. 
As to Point 3 on page 14, there is dispute as to what 
conversations took place between the parties, but this issue is 
immaterial because Scott Egbert never showed any reliance on 
what he said occurred. If he had thought there was a valid 
fourth note and made even one payment which the bank accepted, 
he might have a case for estoppel. But no facts are alleged by 
appellants to support an estoppel argument. Reliance is neces-
sary for an estoppel argument. Corbin on Contracts, Section 
194. 
Appellants' Point 4 on page 14 alleges collection ef-
forts were made by respondent which shows the proposed fourth 
note was valid. Respondent agrees there was contact between the 
parties but what occurred is disputed. However, even if respon-
dent had tried to collect on the proposed fourth note, would 
that make an invalid note valid? Only if one can overcome the 
legal requirements through the equitable remedy of estoppel, if 
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then. And appellants have shown no reliance or detriment be-
cause Scott Egbert never made any payments after the proposed 
fourth note was signed by him. Therefore, there is no equitable 
relief and legally the note cannot stand as a valid one without 
the supporting legal elements such as consideration. 
Appellants Point 5 on page 14 has been previously 
addressed by respondent in this brief. It is again a new issue 
on appeal. 
Therefore, out of 5 alleged "facts and unanswered ques-
tions" which appellants in their Point III of their brief say 
should be determined by a trier of fact, none were argued by 
appellants in the lower court, although two, numbers 3 and 4, 
were addressed in affidavits. And respondent claims these two 
are not relevant because no estoppel or other legal basis was 
alleged to overcome the illegality of the proposed fourth note. 
The appellants have, therefore, not raised a sufficient 
legal or factual issue on appeal which would warrant this court 
reversing the lower court's summary judgment. 
POINT III 
THE COURT HAD THE POWER TO GRANT RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE BASIS OF RESPONDENT'S MOTION 
IS A QUESTION OF LAW AND NOT A QUESTION OF FACT 
The basic policy of Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure is if there is no material dispute as to the facts, 
then the moving party should prevail if by law the party would 
be entitled to do so. Burningham v. OTT, 525 P.2d 620. The 
basis of respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment was that the 
proposed fourth promissory note was not a valid contract. The 
basic facts were not contested by either party. The intentions 
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of the parties were clearly rnanif est on the face of the instru-
ments. They showed that both Scott and Pamela Egbert were to 
sign the instruments and that the additional consideration of 
the assignment of escrow and deed was needed as a condition for 
issuing the proposed fourth promissory note. These two items 
were never done and therefore, the proposed fourth promissory 
note was not a binding instrument. 11 Am Jur 2d, Bills and 
Notes, Section 216, page 245 states: 
"Consideration is not always a fact question. If 
all the facts concerning the issue of consideration 
are without dispute, such issue becomes a question 
of law." 
Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment questioned the 
validity of the proposed fourth promissory note. The question 
of validity is a legal one to be determined by the court if all 
the facts before the court are uncontested. 
". • . the evidence upon which one relies for judgment can be, and should be,. known to the 
opponent; and when all the evidence is known, if 
there is no dispute on any material issue of fact, 
the rules provide that the court may apply the law 
and thus terminate the matter, thereby conserving 
the time of the court and avoiding expense to the 
state and to the litigants." Burningham v. 
OTT, 525 P.2d at 621-622. 
There were no new facts alleged by appellants at the 
time of respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment which would go 
to the validity of the note which were not already before the 
court by way of pleadings, affidavits and exhibits of the par-
ties. Therefore, respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment was 
correctly within the province of the court to grant. 
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POINT IV 
IN ORDER TO DEFEAT A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
THE OPPOSING PARTY HAS TO ALLEGE FACTS WHICH 
CONTROVERT THE MOVING PARTY'S FACTS. 
In appellants' Memorandum and Affidavit in Opposition to 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment there was not one sub-
stantial fact which the appellants raised which would controvert 
any of the facts which the respondent relied upon in seeking its 
Motion for Summary Judgment from the lower Court. All the 
appellants alleged was the Court had already addressed this 
question in its October 22, 1981 ruling and that the respondent 
was inconsistent in its approach and its position illogical. 
The facts and affidavits of the appellants went to the second 
step of determining the meaning, intent and effect of the pro-
posed fourth promissory note on the three previous notes but did 
not challenge the respondent's facts concerning the validity of 
the proposed fourth promissory note which is the first step that 
must be taken before the second step can be addressed. 
The appellants did not challenge the respondent's facts 
other than to say that they were intentions, and not facts. 
,,,.. ,) 
I 
This type of allegation is insufficient to defeat a MotJ~ ~r 
- ......... / ./ ------
Summary Judgment. 
''(l) An affid-a-vit, supporting or opposing a motion 
for summary judgment is an evidentiary affidavit, 
whose form and content is governed by Rule 56(e), 
U.R.C.P. Such an affidavit must be made on 
personal knowledge of the affiant, set forth facts 
that would be admissible, in evidence, and show 
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to 
testify to the matters stated therein." Western 
States Thrift and Loan Co. v. Blomquist, 29 U. 2d 
at 60-61. 
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In the affidavit of appellants' counsel given in opposi-
tion to respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment, he only 
stated, "at the time of trial said appellants will introduce 
evidence •.. " (paragraph 4, page 2) with no supporting facts 
of what that evidence would be. This is not enough to put the 
moving party's facts in issue to the degree the Court should 
have denied respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The lower court had before it all the pleadings, dis-
covery, arguments and affidavits which either party was going to 
submit since both parties had made motions for summary judgment 
indicating all the facts were before the court for a decision. 
It was able to view the whole matter and get to the heart of the 
issue, which Rule 56 allows. 
"The rule has been interpreted more articulately by 
eminent authorities on the subject who suggest that 
the rule permits us to pierce the pleading, 
resulting in a summary judgment, if an examination 
of facts developed under the discovery procedure, 
by affidavit, deposition, admission and the like, 
makes it appear that no genuine issue of fact is 
presentable. To travel beyond that point would be 
a waste of time, energy and ost. The rule 
designedly seeks to elirn· rotraction, absent 
issues of fact, ex 1t g lit. ation in an area 
where possible conges c ndars point up the 
truism that justice de ed is justice denied." 
Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Cunningham, 10 
u.2d at 332. 
Therefore, the lower court correctly granted respon-
dent's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the facts raised and the documents before it, 
the lower court could see what the parties had intended on doing 
but their intentions never came about because Pamela Egbert 
-21-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
failed to sign the documents and the agreed upon security was 
never given the bank. There was no valid fourth note. 
The appellants are now on appeal trying to make a meal 
without the main course. Both parties, by the written instru-
ments, and their affidavits, have shown that the agreed upon 
consideration was to be the deed and assignment by both Scott 
Egbert and Pamela Egbert to property in Ogden. Without that 
security, there was no loan. The appellants did not contest 
that fact prior to summary judgment being granted. They are 
trying now, on apeal, to make a valid loan from an invalid one 
by using incidentals instead of the agreed upon consideration. 
Most of the issues mentioned in their brief were never 
(leveV" 
raised in the lower court and they~asserted any material facts 
to contradict the exhibits and affidavits of the respondent. 
The simple summation of this case is there never was a 
contract, i.e. fourth note, because Scott Egbert and Pamela 
Egbert failed to perform on their agreed upon promises. 
Judge Palmer was legally and factually justified in 
granting respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment based on the 
pleadings, facts and exhibits before him at the time, which 
showed the respondent was entitled as a matter of law to summary 
judgment. 
lower 
The respondent therefore respectfully asks that the 
court's judgment be affirmed. 
RespeCtfully submitted this ~~dday of June, 1982. 
c~~~----
Attorney for Plaintiff /Respondent 
437 North Wasatch Drive 
Layton, "•"'"' 0AnA1 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that the foregoing Brief of Respondent 
was duly served on counsel for the appellants, Reed M. Richards, 
2568 Washington Boulevard, Ogden, Utah 84401, by mailing two (2) 
copies thereof this ./'f'-{jday of June, 1982. 
-23-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"APPENDIX A" 
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Scott Egbert, Ali Scott L. lgbert ana Puea 17Coen, ilA Pu -coen-
1767·27th Street, Ogden, Utah INSTALLMENT PROMISSORY NOTE [ C't 91 
... ~~~?:. 92 -·-·-··-· .... LaJtaa , Utah .. t~~~ . ..?.k~-- 19..1~ .. 
The Undersigned, jointly and severally, promise to pay to the order of .. mE. . .J'IIS!...lilICIUL. .. Bm OF .. .LiltolL._ ...... --
1t ...................... I..Arrem-... --..... -... ·--··-----··-·· Utah, or at such other place as the holder hereof may d•ignate in writing the eum of 
lhirl.een.Th011eand Hine lftmdmd .ZU.t):_Sueu •™" ffJ!~ ---~ ·--------- ----- DOI..I.Am 
,1l3.1.2S.7.!n. ....... -....... ), in Rucceasive monthly installments of $ .. _. _ _!_ _ each, due on the aame 
day of each month commencing ·····~--~~~~-~--~.5.~---·---. 1a!L and continuing until the whole amount thereof bu been paid 
.The ANNUAL PERCENTAGE RATE ----·---~.J .• U ____ ~ . 
The unpaid balance may be paid in full at any time and any unearned finance charp will be refunded baed on the "Rule of 78'L" 
'u any inatallment ia not paid in full within 10 daya after ita due date. a charp may be weHed of S 5.0Q ________ or at holder'• 
election, an amount equal to the annual percentage rate stated above timea the unpaid amount of the imtallmant from tbe due date of the 
installment until paid in fulL 
U the bolder· deems itaelf insecure or if default be made in payment in whole or in put of any installment at the time when or the 
place where the same becomes due and payable as aioresaicl then the entire unpaid balance, aha1l. at the election of the holder hereof and 
without notice of aaid election, at once become due and payable. In event of any such default or acceleration, the undersign~ join~ and 
1mrally, agree to pay to the holder hereof reasonable attomeya• fees, lepI expenaea and lawful collection costa in addition to all other suma 
due hereunder. Any balance unpaid on maturity of this note ahail bear intenwt thereafter, both before and after judgment, at the annual 
percentage rate stated above. 
PIWDtment, demand, proteet, notice of diaho•or and a:teulion of time without he undersiped con-
llD& to the releue of any aecurity, or any pa.rt thereof, with or without mhatitution. 
Thia not. II w=ared by a Secarity Apeement of even data. 
AddJW ll~J.-=ll.th Stree~. Ogden, Utah. 
Sae 
Addnm ----------·--------------------------- --------
_____________ .... ______ _ 
,, 
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---~P~~· -'6- Rf:ffri~ce Loans 
Re-pay; From Income and 18le 
01-391. 3-C-33 
of property 
LOAN DISCLOSURE STATEMENT c1 ':\~s ~o 
~ .·11. (Direct Loan-Unaecured or Non-Real Estate Security) 
Lender: .. THE . .nlS'? .. 11.lllCll.il. . .BMil .. OF.. I.ilT.ON., .. LllT!li, .. UT.AH ............................................................................. . 
1 (Street address, City, State, Zip) 
Borro~~-t.~ .. k~tn ..... .u.4 .. S~Q~-~-·~-~ .. k~~ .. ~~-·f.~.~ .. ~~~~'--·~·-~~--~g~~.~-····································· 
Name 1767-27tb Street 1 Ogden, Utah• (Street addreu, City. State, Zip) 
1. Proceeds of Loan .01-l9163~·32 - $6664.23,.. 33 $1668.bl,.. 76481 l3SO . _ $ .... ~~~-~.5.1 ..... 
2. Other c!aarges: ft!~e!8o8i~~;7i134!68)93 Auto Ina. ett 11-26-77 .. 264000 Fees or taxes. ...... . ........................................ ~bat.ract. & .Bae •............... $ ....... 8.6.00. 
Credit Life and/or Disability Insurance not required by Lender $ ..... 544.36. 
Physical Damage Insurance $ .................. . 
Misc. charges: ........... .. . ..... .. . . .. . . . . . . .. . .... ............. .. . ........... .... ....................... .. ..... $ .................. . 
··································································································· $ .................. . 
3. Amount financed ( 1 + 2) 
4. FINANCE CHARGE 
5. Tota) of Payments (3 + 4) -
Paya hie as checked: 
D Single payment on .......................................... , 19 ........ . 
D ... 72 successive monthly installments of $ ... 19.3.86 .... each on the .... 2Sib. .. day of 
each month commencing ..... ltP~~-~--~S.~, 19.1.~ .. , with final installment in 
amount of$ .................... due on .......................................... , 19 .......... . 
D ........................................................................................................................................... - .. . 
.............................. ..... .. .. ........ .. . ... . . ....... ..... .......... ....... ............................... ·························-··· 
............................................................................................................... ············ .................... . 
D Balloon payment of $ .................... due .............................. , 19...... .. may be refinanced 
$ ....................... . 
$ ... -~~~-~-~3. .... . 
$ .... ~)0 .. 29 .... . 
$.JJ9S1 ... 22 .... . 
as follows: ............................................................................................................................ . 
6. ANNUAL PERCENTAGE RATE. • - - - - - - • l~-~-~---% 
7. Any charges paid by Borrower not included in Amount Financed or Finance Charge: 
................................................................ $.................... ········································································ $ ................... . 
................................................................ $.................... . ..................................................... :~ ................ $ ................... . 
B. Prepaid Finance Charge $ .................. ; Required Deposit Balance $ .................. ; Total Prepaid Finance Charge 
and Required Deposit Balance $ .................... . 
9. Late charges may be imposed as to any installment not paid in full within 10 days after its due date and 
if imposed will be computed in the manner checked (If both metho'ds are checked, either may be used): 
ti A late charge of .... S .. % of the installment, but not exceeding $5. 
~ An amount equal to the annual percentage rate stated above times the amount of the installment for the 
period from the due date of the installment until payment thereof. counting each day as I/30th of• month. 
Reasonable attorney's fees, legal expenses and lawful collection costs incurred after default may also be 
imposed. 
10. Prepayment: 
If loan is prepaid in full, any unearned finance charge will be refunded based on the rule of 78's unless refund 
is less than $5 where amount financed is $75 or less or $7.50 where amount financed is more than $75. 
11. Security for loan: 
Lender may off set against this loan any account or amounts owed by Lender in any capacity to Borrower. 
D The loan is otherwise unsecured. 
G This loan (and any future or other indebtedness) will be secured by a Security Agreement covering the 
folJOWing personal propert197iw r~~ei..<>1 se~!~ aC~~JY.~~l& '"'l2Ji}],~················ .. ···000 " 00"··· 
........................................................................... $ ............... ~ ........................................................................................ . 
. . . ... . . . .... ..... ... . . md .. u.e.ill)Mnt ... o~ .. Ba.al. .. &a.1ia te .. .cant.n.ot. ........................................................................... .. 
Physical clamBfe insurance for such property: 
D Is not required by Lender 
[J Is required by Lender and may be obtained by Borrower from any source, the Lender reserving the right to 
refuse to accept any insurer for reasonable cause. · 
I will obtain physical damage insurance. 
8-21.-78 
Borrower's signature Date Signed Date Signed 
If Lender is authorized to obtain such insurance, the cost for a policy expiring ·············· months from issue 
will be $ ........................ based upon current rates and representations of Borrower as to the use of t.he rro· 
perty and the classification of such property and of Borrower for insurance purposes. Coverage wil be 
against loss of or damage to such property only and w ill not include coverage for public liability or dam-
age to other property. 
12. Credit Insurance: 
D Credit life insurance is required by Lender and cost is included in Finance Charge. 
~ Credit life and/or disability insurance is not required to obtain this loan, purchase of such through Lender 
being voluntary on part of Borrower. If Borrower wishes such credit insurance, the Borrower to be in· 
sured must sign the appropriate statement below: 
I desire credit and disability insurance. Cost$ ............. . 
Borrower's signature Date Signed Date Signed 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF RECEIPT 
The undersigned Borrower acknowledges receipt of a 
documents evidencing or securing the proposed loan. 
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.• 
"THIS IS A LEGALLY BINDING COlITRACT, IF NOT UNDERSTOOD SEEK OTHER CO}fi>ETENT ADVICE." 
UNIFORM REAL ESTA TE .CONTRACT 
I. THIS AGREEMENT, made in duplicate thia 29th day of Se;kmber 
by and betwHn !ELAND F • BROADBENT ARD m:LVA M. BROADBEBT, hia wife 
I A. D;. 11.77_ 
2. WITNESSETH: That the SelJer, for the consideration. herein mentioned agrees to 1e11 and convey to the buyer, 
and the bu~·u for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to purcha1e the followin& described real·property, aituat,. i" 
the count>· of Weber , State of Utah, to-wit: 1767 -; 22nd Street Osden, Utah 
More particular!)' described aa follow1: ADDRl'.88 
All ot Lot 17, Block 39, 1'0B HILL ADDITION, to Osden City, Weber County, Utah, 
acecrding to the official plat thereot. 
I. Said Buyer hereby •INH to enter Into pout11lon ind pa1 for aald described preml1ea the aum of -----
~ J'Olll_jfil)USAHD AID ll0/100 - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - , ~onan c. 2~, ooo no ) 
~~b~~~e~fiu~~~~hbus~MMMdu~~B~~~~~~aS~,~~~~·~~~~~~~~~~~----~--
1trictl)' within the following timea, to-wit: mEE :IBOtSAND AND 10/100 - • - • - - <t 3,000.00 
cash, the ttceipt of which la hereb)' aclcnowledsed, and the balance of• 21, 000.00 abJI be paid•• followa: 
$190.00, ar mare, beg1DD1ng Bovember 1, 1977 and •190.00, ar mere, an the lat clay ot each 
month thereafter until the Pltincipal :Balance together vith accrued Interest baa been paid 
in full. · 
In addition to the above menticmed payment, the Jhl1er1 agree to make an a441 tlonal 
payment ot $31.00 tar a Reserve Account a1 follOVB: $25.00 tcr taxe• and $'.00 t~ 
tire insurance iremium1. 
1be Jhqera agree to increase said lesene pa)'llll9Dt1 lt necessary, clue to an increase ln 
taxes and/ar insurance premiums. 
Poaae11ion of aald premises ahalJ be delivered to buyer on tht lat ~. dar of October 11-11. 
'· Said mont.hJ7 payment.a are to be applied first to the payment of la~ ad Meond to the reduction of the 
principl. Jntere1t ahalJ be charred from October· Jr, ~977 . ·· .: r: · A·:.>r{: · .. :. ... on all unpaid portlon1 of the 
purchaH prit'e at the rate of Eight &; 112.per cent ( BA- ~) ~ an~am. The lurer, at hla option at anytime. 
may pay amount• in ucesa of the monthly paymentl upon the unpaid balaMe subject to the Hmitation1 of anJ mortrare 
or contract b)' tht Buyer herein as~umed. such excess to be applied either to unpaid principal or In prepayment of future 
inst.ailment• at the election of the buyt'r, which election mu1t be ma<H at the time the 1acea1 payment is made. 
6. It i1 undnstoocf a'nd agreed that if the Seller accept• payment from the Buyer on thl1 contract lea1 than according 
to the terms herein mentioned, then by ao doing, it will ID no way alter the term• of the contract aa to the forfeiture 
hereinafter atipuJated, or as to any other remedies of the aeller. 
I. It is undentood that there presently exi1t1 an obliption again1t aald propertJ la fa•or of--------
- • • ' "\'. . . .a. - ~ ..... 
-----........ --------• ... a .. ~-- , .. -,- :Jw-.; ·;-·-""::_with an unpaid balance of 
.. ' .. -
··----
.~------~· a1 of -------------------------------
7. Seller '*present.a that there are no unpaid special improvement di1trict tuea coYerinc improvementa to •Id pr1m-
i1es now in the process of being installed, or which have been completed and not paid for, outa&andinc aplnat uid prop. 
erty, except the following Bone!:....-.-----------------------------------
8. The Seller is given the option to secure, ezecute and maintain Joana aecared br aai• propem j' not to eKCM'd the 
then urid •ontra•l balanro hereunder, bearing interHl at the rale of not lo exeeed Bight and l _ 2 portent 
( 8 r,-,) per .annum and pa~·able in regular monthly inataUment.s; provided that the accrecat.e monthly lnatallment 
payments re'fuired to be made by St'ller on said loans shall not be creater than each in1tallment payment required to be 
made b)' the Buyer under this contract. When the principal due hereunder haa been reduced to tbe amount of any auch 
loans and mortgages the Seller agr<>es to convey and the ~uyer 1greu to aecept title to the above deacribecl property 
1ubject to said loans and mortgages. · 
9. If the Buyer desirH to exercise his right through accelerated payment• under thia acreement to pay off anJ obh-
Jations outstanding at date of this agreemf'nt against said property, it shall be the Buyer'• obligation to aasume and 
pay any penalt)' which may be required on prepayment of aaid prior obligation1. Prepayment penaltiea in reaped 
to obh~ations aeain!'t Hid rroperty incurred hy aelJer, after date or thil asreement, ahall be paid by atller UnltH 
said nblilt"•tions are assume or appro\'ed by · bu)'er. 
10. The Buyer agrees upon written rPc1uest of thf' SeJJer to maier application to • reliable J.ndtor for a loan of auch 
amount a..c; can .be ucured under the rt-J?ulations of said lender and herehy •«Tees to appl)' any amount 10 rec:eivt-il u~~>n 
the purchau price above m~nl1oned, and to uerute the papers required and pay one·half the expenses necessary 1n <1h-
t.ainin.: aaicl l"an, .thl' Sell~r aJ,•rt-.. 1ng to pay the other one-half, pronded however, that the monthly payment.I and 
inh:fl'sl rate requm.•d, ahalJ not exrud the monthly payments and interest rate as outlined above. 
J1. The Buyer agree a to pay all taxes and a!lisessments or every kind and nature whirh are or v.·hirh may he aast s1t>ii 
and v. hich may berome due on tht'M' premises during the life of this agreement. The Sellu hereby covenanLr. and a~rns 
that there arf' no asst·ssments a~aini1t 1aid premia«'' except the following: 
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ASStGNMLNT OF ESCROW 
BUYER - SELLING 
KNOW ALL MEN BY TI-IESE PRF.SENTS: 
That (vendor) .......... ~~~t-.~---~-~- .. ~l~~-~---~-~--~~--~.I~.~~--··················-··········-·······································• 
of ········· Qg.~~1 .. Y~·-····················································-··· .. ············ ....• for and in consideration of the sum of 
Thi~~-~---~~~-~-~--!~!: .. ~~~---~!.~l .. ~!.~ .. -~.~--~(!~ ... ~:::::::::::=::-.::.::. DOLLARS, 
and other valuable considerations, to (him) (her) (them) in hand paid by (vendee) ·······-··············-······---······· 
THE FI~~ -~-~-~~--~~~---~---~-~---········-······················· of .... ~~-1 ... ~~---··········-··--··································· 
rt'ccipt ot which is hereby aclcnowleged, (do) (does) hereby sell, transfer, assign and set over unto the 
vcndce all right, title, interest and equity in that certain contract and escrow agreement executed by 
Leland F • ... ».~4~~---~~---~-~~:!~ .. .K.4! ... ~-~-~~-~~-~---············• party of the first part and ·······--····························-··-··· 
Scott -~.! ... ~l~~-~---~-~.!.~ .. ~~-~~L~! .. ~-~ party of the second part, dated .... Septaher. .. 2,9th ............. , 
19 .. 7.1.., and filed with the First National Bank of Layton, Uta~ covering the sale of the real estate 
described as follows: 
ill ot Lot 17, Block 39, IOB HILL !DDITION, to Ogden Cit7, 
Weber Count7, Utah, according to the atticial plat thereot.· 
The balance of principal due on said escrow on ____ __!~-~~- 24th 1978 ., la 
-··-··-··-·---··--·············--·--·-··--····-······-·-··---··---··-··----··-·-··--·· OOLLARS, 
and the Interest on said escrow is paid to-·····-··-·-··-······---··-·-·-·····-·• 19 ____ _, which baiance of principal 
and interest the said vendee assumes and promises and agrees to pay. 
To have and to hold the Jame unto the said vendee, heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns, 
subject, nevertheless, to the covenants and conditions contained in said escrow agreement. 
Further (I) (we) have executed and delivered herewith, in order to more effectively transfer all 
equity, a deed covering the property described in the deed held with the escrow agreement herein referred to, 
and hereby authorize and instruct the escrow holder In case of the forfeiture of said escrow agreement, to cancel 
such deed and return ft to us, or to retain ft in Its files, hut If the payments shall he made u specified, then 
upon delivery of the other papers to the purchaser, the escrow holder is hereby Instructed to deliver this 
deed with the other papers. 
Vendee assumes and agrees to pay said contract as therein provided, and further to asmme all 
the obligadons of said contract as therein provided, and to perform In accordance with the covenants and 
conditions thereof. 
~-~-h-ere·o~~~e~-~~ ·~.. r haW ~-=:.:.~::~~--~~=~-:~:: .. ~-~~::~.-~: .. ·_:::_°.! 
······ · ····················-··-·····"Cv ~d~;)-·· ·· ·····--····-······-··· (Vendee) 
~~~~~-~ii~ .... _ . .. . .... l SS. 
On this ........ 2"tb .............. day of .......... .lucu.t ..... ·-··············-··-········ 19 ... .7Jl personally appeared before 
me ....... ~~~-~--~~--~~~.~--~~ .. ?..~ ... ¥.c.~.~---···-··-······-··················-··············-······-······-······-··············-···········• 
the signer.• .... of the within instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that ···---~U ...... e1ecuted the same. 
My Commlaion Expires: 
...... 1~1~ .................................... . Notary Public residing in ....... ~ •.. Utah. .. ______ _ 
ST&~~:f lj._~ .............. J ss. 
On this ..... ~4~~ ·-············· day of ..........• ~'~·-·········································-··· 19 .78 .. , personally appeared 
g:ore me ----~~·- .8 ..... ~!~~ .... wllo •... l!.GPa .. l>.J'. .. H .. ~.nom- .. d.1d. .. 1q ... tbat .. b.4! .. il .. fJ'Hldent 
iiJirJ,lj}j~;hM,;i.~Htxlfi~ifi,Uf¥:tj},.;:~~fnltiffx 
•igned in "t:>ehalt o_t •aid co~ration b7 author.!. t1 ot a re1olution ot it• Board of 
Di"91roNJ11aM ~: George B. Wilcox, aclmowl9e11ed .. :t.o ...... t.bat .. ..U--GWpOn.tion.-.eucuted 
the 1aae 
coma. Bxl;~ ··1~1o.;.at·····--··············· Notary Public, n*I" if 4• ........................... -.......... -...... . Beeiding in Lqton, Utah. 
Vendor - Seller 
VcndC'c - Buyer 
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"TH~S IS A LEGALLY BINDING CONTRACT. IF NOT UNDERSTOOD SEEK COMPETENT ADVICE. 
Recorded at Request of _______ . ___ .... ___ -----·-----------------·_·-----------_._ __ .... ___ ----------------- ----------------- ---------------
at ..... ___ .. M. Fee Paid $. _. ____ . ________ .. _. ____________ .. ____ ... __ ... __ ..... __ ·--- ... -~- ___ ... _ .... ·-------- _ ------------- _________ ---------
by __________________________ . -------------------- Dep. Book ______________ .. Page____________ Ref.:----------------------------------
Mail tix notice to·----------------------------------------------- Address. ________________ . ______________ ---------------------------------. 
QUIT-CLAIM DEED 
Scott L. F.gbert and Paa Egbert, hi• vite 
of Ogden , County of Weber 
QUIT-CLAIM to 
TB! FIBST RATICll.AL UNK OF LilTCfi, 
grantor • 
, State of Utah, hereby 
grantee 
of LA?TOM, UTAH ------ • • ••• • -····--------for the sum of 
Tm Dollara and other good and Yaluable coneiderationa ----DOLLARS, 
the following described tract of land in 
State of Utah: 
Weber County, 
ill o! Lot 17, Block 39, ROB BILL ADDITION, to Ogden Ci t7, 1ieber Count7 
Utah, according to the otticial plat thereor. 
WITNESS the hand of said grantorll , this 
.lugut , A. D. one thowand nine hund 
Signed in the presence of -~--
STATE OF UTAH, 
} SS. 
CouNTY OF Davia 
On the 24th 
personally appeared before me 
day of August 
Scott L. Egbert and Pa11 Egbert, 
, A.D. 19 78 
the signer8 of the within instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that t he7 executed the 
same. 
M~· comm :ss~.on expires 
-~ 
Notary Public. 
7-10-78 T•-+on U•-~ 
--------Residing in __ M-J __ "_• __ ~_1 _____ _ 
APPROVED FORM - UTAH SECURITIES COMMISSION 
F"ORM 10;?-r:i'.d ! :.I.AIM _.£0-Kf.LLY CO. '!l'!I W NINTH SOUTH SL c UTAH 
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